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officials and powerful local notables -cut off from state largesse as aid and loans from former colonial powers dwindle or come with harsher conditions. Meanwhile, enterprising strongmen find that cultivating a personal following among people exploited in the past, especially youth, offers them better prospects for personal gain than does loyalty to old patrons. Recent economic changes also make commercial opportunities more readily available to assertive strongmen. Incumbent rulers discover that they must devise new ways to control these changes if they are to remain in power.
These new forms of political organization undermine economic development, lead to overlapping jurisdictions, promote conflicts among elites, and intentionally destroy bureaucracies. Equally important, they reflect efforts by rulers to manage disruptions of old internal political arrangements that follow from sudden shifts in the post-cold war international context. Innovations are also rarely efficient. This essay, however, takes currently existing political units in Africa seriously; it focuses on rulers' experimentation with innovative solutions to replace political arrangements that are no longer sustainable. Case studies from Liberia and Sierra Leone illustrate how new systems of rule emerge and why nonstate organizations displace sovereign states as rulers try to manage rapid internal and global change in ways that permit the survival of their regimes.
Marginality and Innovation
Recent neoliberal analyses of Africa's declining political economies often depict "emerging civil society" as filling in for incapable or illegitimate state bureaucracies. For example, some regard informal market organizations as adaptations of business classes that will eventually demand autonomy from corrupt states and move to protect their interests vis-a-vis state officials.7 This shift in sovereignty from "a people's" territorial rights vis-a-vis the rest of the world to popular rights vis-avis predatory state interests may occur where relatively higher degrees of regime legitimacy and national identity exist, as in Benin and Zambia.
But social action, even when evading or condemning state power, does not signal the emergence of autonomous civil society and collapse of predatory state power. In Togo, Cameroon, and Kenya, for example, popular protests have met organized state resistance. Zaire's president Mobutu has manipulated and coopted illicit trade to finance his power,8 intervened in ethnic battles to promote allies,9 and claimed a growing share of French foreign aid amidst nearly total bureaucratic collapse to build new ties to subjects and external actors.' And in Liberia and Somalia, bureaucratic collapse and elite conflict have not liberated society from oppressive state power. Instead, they have cleared the way for individual state officials to regain personal power through new arrangements with internal and external actors.
In this context it is difficult to label activities that chip away at state bureaucratic power as "state" or "nonstate." For example, the illicit financial activities of Malian marabout and entrepreneur Mohamed Cisse, confidant of Benin's former president Kerekou and former associate of Zaire's President Mobutu, weakened bureaucracies while strengthening the rulers' powers." Is Djily M'baye -Ivoirian commodity trader, Sierra Leone kola nut kingpin, confidant of Senegal's president Diouf, and advisor to late Ivoirian president Houphouet Boigny -an agent of state power or a private businessman?"2 Should UNITA be understood as Angolan rebels or as Mobutu's commercial collaborators? Are Somalia's "warlords" social actors in a sovereign vacuum or elites of a defunct state pursuing domination by alternate means?
Noting the difficulty in distinguishing between private and state power in some contexts, Migdal avers that "the state is not a fixed ideological entity ... it embodies an ongoing dynamic, a changing set of goals, as it engages other social groups."'3 Development, or more generally using bureaucracies to organize people and production more efficiently, is not necessarily the most rational basis to exercise power in these settings of elite conflict. Ayoob, for example, observes that African rulers protect their regimes by controlling strongmen at the expense of popular legitimacy or definition of a distinct state interest.14 A ruler's personal survival is often at odds with the task of building strong state agencies." Migdal notes that some officials destroy state bureaucracies to deny power bases to potential rivals.'6 Contra Huntington, the appearance of leaders who seek stability amidst crisis through abjuring bureaucratic institutions shows how political authority can be built in radically different ways. Bayart's image of a "familial state" captures the diverse networks of power in Africa that stray from conventional notions of distinct categories of state power and interest."
The configuration of political authority provides a basis to explain the transformation of the process of building political units in places where old strategies for maintaining weak states in Africa are no longer viable. What Bayart calls "transcontinental sociability" distinguishes dominant elite coalitions from lower levels in a hierarchy of groups. He notes that elite mediation between internal and external forces extends well beyond recognized formal juridical and territorial boundaries of state action. For example, Ivory Coast's late president maintained ties of marriage to leaders throughout western Africa."8 Shifts in such regional and local elite relations are integral aspects of comparisons of recent transformations of state power. Especially after the cold war this continental social hierarchy faces new threats. Incumbent rulers, strongmen, leaders of commercial networks, and foreign contractors vie for the right to wage war and make alliances. Rivals enjoy easier access to weapons, further weakening state control of coercion. Distinctions between public and private and between domestic and external became even more blurry, belying notions of political organization that presume distinct bureaucratic states ruling mutually exclusive jurisdictions.
Changes in the character of these informal avenues of elite power also have dramatic implications for the exercise of power in political units that retain more conventional state-like features. This situation recalls Piault's notion of historical "rupture," in which previous arrangements become unsustainable.19 Similarly, Braudel distinguishes between a history of events and the longue duree.20 In periods of global stability, as in the cold war, rulers adapt to a more predictable pace of change with incremental adjustments. For example, financial support encouraged some rulers to align with a superpower to resolve internal security threats within existing norms of interstate behavior, while using this income to build informal patron-client networks. 2 The apparent strength of Marxist-Leninist variants of state organization appealed to others as a way to manage ethnically divided polities.22 Under the guise of economic planning most rulers put state bureaucracies to work at the task of accumulating and distributing patronage to elites. Rulers also found that cold war superpower patrons put a premium on maintaining inherited colonial entities and conforming to specific rules and norms that otherwise constrained their latitude of action.
Recent These local efforts to manage broad post-cold war changes weaken bureaucratic state institutions but leave available to rulers and strongmen alike a wider range of informal and illicit means to pursue their interests. Thus, external politics are central in understanding internal shifts. Just as postcolonial state rulers manipulated economic policies to buttress elite political networks, rulers continue to rework the logic of markets and manipulate the interests of external agents. This rational pursuit of power can translate into extortion from aid organizations, manipulation of drug and diamond trades, profit from forced labor, "official" looting operations, and control of markets through alliances with new foreign commercial partners. 28 The success of these innovations in sustaining rulers, in turn, influences the strategies of other watchful rulers who face their own unruly rivals. An understanding of these innovations and the role that outsiders play in making them work helps explain why a wider variety of political units exist in Africa today than before the end of the cold war.
These variations in crisis management and its corollary, political entrepreneurship, show that evolution toward idealized state forms and distinct spheres of state and civil society is unlikely among Africa's weakest states. Indeed, external efforts to promote them, insofar as they increase rulers' internal threats, prompt more intense and innovative crisis management. Rulers facing pressures from creditors, for example, destroy politically unreliable bureaucracies in the name of austerity. They contract out official functions to outsiders who arrive at the behest of creditorsponsored foreign investment programs, freeing themselves to attack rivals and use violence to extract resources from people under their control. This example shows how recent global change does not necessarily favor economic efficiency or mass mobilizing territorial states. Some subjects can resist and force limits on what they will tolerate. Involved foreigners bring their own interests to this dynamic. In the cases below, rulers manage these groups, often at the expense of less pressing (and more conventional "statist") concerns. Intensified internal exploitation is connected to regime survival. Crisis management of rulers and would-be rulers detaches political authority from the institutions, risks, and costs of the weak state and reduces the state's significant if uneven commitment to some citizens. This trend is likely to continue where creditor demands for austerity involve massive civil service layoffs, as in Sierra Leone. Promises from Zairian prime minister Kengo to trim that country's civil service from 600,000 to 50,000 will further undermine conventional state organizations there.67 Catechisms of reform -of free markets and reduced government -applied by rulers facing extreme internal security threats, as in Zaire, recall more basic political priorities of the early colonial catechism of mise en valeur. Rulers devise new ways to control strongmen, discipline subjects, and put them to work to accumulate wealth at the cheapest possible cost. Both Taylor and Boley, as officials in past Liberian governments, had some (minimal) interest in maintaining a distinct state organization. But now their fate is less meaningfully connected to the fate of a public realm in the sense of serving the interests or caring about judgments of more than a handful of clients and allies. Accumulation to finance control over commerce and people now overshadows concerns with development.
Reconfiguration Outside Norms of
Crisis managing rulers in weak states struggle for the widest possible control over economic interactions. International borders and internal bureaucracies become expensive liabilities, especially when targets of control are regional commercial networks. Likewise, they ignore truly marginal areas. In Liberia, for example, factions have abandoned to armed youths the looted and depopulated sections of Lofa county, far from trade routes with Sierra Leone. In Zaire, President Mobutu has controlled mining and logging areas and manipulated aid to Rwandan refugees irrespective of international borders.68 TO the extent that territorial control can be mapped, political units based upon violent accumulation center on archipelagos of control rather than contiguous terrain. Rulers of these political units make little effort to cultivate popular loyalty.
Sustainability is a major issue in assessing claims that these political units represent synchronic alternatives to states in Africa. Taylor's introduction of his own currency and Boley's restriction of trade in areas under his control show that they take threats of flight and evasion of their authority seriously. Strasser's difficulty in disciplining officers and regulating diamond mining reflects his struggle to control the area's largest source of wealth without relying upon his own increasingly threatening countrymen. These strategies attract enclave mining firms which fill in for productive subjects. However, foreign allies may consider Strasser and Taylor expendable, if successors are committed to controlling commerce for mutual benefit. While foreigners help rulers maintain discipline among subjects and pare down old patron-client networks, rulers face incentives to pare back even further to reduce the chance that more ruthless and efficient rivals will be more appealing partners to foreigners. The greatest security threat to rulers, like Strasser, with remnant bureaucracies lies among anxious strongmen within ruling juntas, who fear being cut out of deals with foreigners.
These new political units are also not clearly compatible with each other. Warfare among them arises over contested jurisdictional claims. Recent peace accords among Liberian strongmen are not likely to endure for long. Populations face conflicting demands from contending organizations. Competition to extend economic power makes it difficult for outsiders and neighbors to discern where the limits to authority are located. Conflict among these units is therefore contagious. The propensity for conflict, while intensifying pressures on neighboring rulers to innovate, also threatens stability among such political units. But where rulers perceive that the power capabilities of these new political units match or exceed a regional community of weak states, alternative power configurations become more attractive and the need for mimicry and innovation becomes more urgent.
The viability of the new political units depends on resolving the problem of exit and discipline where the pursuit of power undermines continuity and calculability. Here, the special role of the foreign contractor marks a fundamental shift in the rules of African interunit politics. Whereas the "quasi-state" of the postcolonial era was built with resources provided by more powerful states, weak post-cold war African states attract external partners who expect high profits in exchange for services rendered and risk incurred. This new arrangement intensifies exploitation of subjects and further removes political authority from them. Contractor partners, in turn, help enforce discipline for those unable to leave and reduce consequences of exit for local rulers where they directly take over productive activities.
Contractor mediation between African political units and global markets shows strong affinities with political alliances that predate the cold war's end. Executive 
